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CONTENTS

Man and His Values Considered Neurologically: RICHARD M. BRICKNER 225

Book Review 243

ALBERT POST, *Popular Freethought in America, 1825–1850,* and SIDNEY WARREN, *American Freethought, 1860–1914:* LAURENCE SEARS

Book Notes 248

A. F. NELSON, *The Structure of Normative Ethics.*

The Contribution of Holland to the Sciences. A Symposium edited by A. J. Barnouw and B. Landheer.

Other New Books and Journals 251

Notes and News 252

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

MAN AND HIS VALUES CONSIDERED NEUROLOGICALLY [1]

THE BRAIN AS A SOCIAL ORGAN

WHEN we discuss values, we are considering a product which has originated in the nervous system and has been filtered through the brain. No questionings, no answerings, no evaluations, can originate or exist at all except through the activities of that very brain. The brain is like all other internal organs, in that it functions without knowing that it does so. The tissue of most of these organs lacks the sense of pain and indeed all the ordinary sensations; thus they are without any of the means of self-identification that such a tissue as the skin possesses. The brain, by virtue of its lack of consciousness of itself at work, welcomes its own products with a sort of surprise and tends to regard them as independent realities. It is perhaps in that way that philosophy has considered human standards and values, not without great fruit.

Neurology would approach the question of the meaning of values from an entirely different starting point. Neurology would try to study the actual performance of the brain in producing values; it would try to unearth some of the tricks the brain plays upon us in initiating the course of events and then hiding its face, as though it had had nothing to do with the case. It would also attempt to disclose those particular functions of the brain which seem to make it incumbent on us to develop certain specific types of values. In this paper, some neurological concepts which bear upon these questions will be presented and an effort will be made to link them with facts and views derived from other fields—evolutionary aspects of biology, psychiatry, and anthropology.

Man has never been completely described, and probably he can not be as yet. Quite possibly, he will not be able to utilize his capacities maximally for his own best benefit until science is able to give a reasonably complete description. We do possess some knowledge of what constitutes man, but even that has been employed only fractionally to serve him. Out of this knowledge, a

[1] Read at the symposium on "Value in a World of Fact" held by the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences at the New School for Social Research, November 28, 1943.

few salient facts and probable suppositions may be chosen for discussion and it may be indicated how they might serve as points of departure for an increase in man's use of himself in his own behalf.

Man is distinguished from all other forms of life by his highly developed forebrain, the frontal lobes in particular, and from all but some of the simians by the opponens pollicis muscle, a small piece of tissue by which the thumb tip can be apposed to any of the finger tips, thus giving us our grasping hand. The total weight of the thumb muscles is negligible and that of the frontal lobes, upon which depend philosophy, evaluation, literature, history, economics, war, peace, and all of man's fate, is about 400 to 500 grams.

Man's current dominant position on this planet is due to those two pieces of tissue. The position is somewhat experimental. It is not saying too much to state that our hope of survival depends upon the ability of our brain to know itself better, to fulfill the hopes and promises that were never made until that pound of cells and fibers evolved within the cranium.

(1) *The Brain and Human Personality in General.* In this communication, the brain will be considered as a social organ. That is a term not customarily used; ordinarily we think of any organ, the brain included, as a thing of importance to the individual and we do not take into account any social meaning it may possess. When we do think biologically of society—and that is not often enough—we consider that each individual as a whole is the unit of society. There is no reason to oppose that general concept except that it is too general to serve every purpose. Sometimes more accuracy and a widening of viewpoint may be gained from more focalized study. And that specific investigation may profitably be pointed upon the brain. The brain is an organ without which interpersonal relationships as we know them can not be held; it is the organ of society. It is not only the chief organ by which the personality is formed; it is also the only funnel for the personality's expression. The brain, as the medium through which one total personality engages himself with and influences another is, in neurological terms, the final common pathway of the personality.

It is important to keep in mind that there are two major parts to the brain from a social standpoint: a very old one and a very new one. The ancient one is the brain stem and the bulbous enlargement at its end, the thalamus. Most of the brain stem is like the spinal cord, and is concerned with primitive and relatively simple reflexes which in us are in principle identical with those of any other vertebrate. The thalamus permits the perception of feeling tone—the contrasting states of comfort and discomfort, of

pleasantness and unpleasantness. Such primitive and basic feelings as those of fear and rage are also probably thalamic or chiefly thalamic in origin, although they may possibly require some of the oldest parts of the forebrain, too. But the expressions of those fundamental feelings can all be made by parts surrounding the thalamus, without any forebrain participation. In respect to all these things and others like them, man does not differ from any other vertebrate.

The forebrain is the part for elaboration of feelings. There are formed the refinements of basic feelings, the countless emotions and sentiments which characterize us, some of which also must belong to other animals, such as the dog and chimpanzee. In man, the frontal lobes, or more specifically the cortex of cells on their surface, are largely concerned with these functions. That cortex is also responsible for our most complex thinking, imagining, hoping, aspiring, being conscious of the self, evaluating. The aspirations of mankind are dreamed largely in the frontal cortex; the appreciation of tenses is there—past and future and memory of the past projected into the future so as to give the future concrete form. The frontal lobes create the more complicated constructions of the conscience and deal perhaps entirely with the sense of shame. They comprise, in great part, the tissue of culture (culture in the anthropological sense). Without any forebrain at all, there could be no more cultural differences between groups of people than between species of fish. If we think of culture as the constellation of habits by which we relate ourselves to each other, we can see that the forebrain, and above all its frontal territory, does all that learning by which we become adherent to the teachings and habits of those around us, or rebellious against them.

Were these frontal lobes suddenly placed in our heads by a stroke of good or bad fortune, in order to give us that supreme place in the living kingdom of which we are so proud—as though their cortex were our own invention? Every evidence indicates that they came, like everything else, by evolution. How, then, can they be regarded in an evolutionary and at the same time functional sense, as parts having survival value? How can they be compared with other physical phenomena, like the fishes' gills or the mechanism for maintaining a relatively constant blood sugar level, or the relative uniformity of the size of individuals, species by species?

(2) *The Brain as a Part with Evolutionary Survival Value. Brain Functions Deriving from that Survival Value.* That comparison can be made. And by doing so we are able to get a dynamic picture of the brain; we can see it as an organ playing its rôle in human life as a part which, through its evolutionary sur-

vival value, was largely responsible for the survival and development of our species. We can perhaps perceive this picture best, if we concentrate upon that unique function of the forebrain which endows it with its evolutionary value—thinking. The whole function of thinking is called the intellectual function and the whole, interrelated mass of thoughts, the intellect.

It is the intellect which, in a biologically novel way, enables us alone to conceive of escape from our instincts. And, by so doing, it tricks us into the illusion that we really do escape from them.

Even in scientific considerations of the function of the forebrain the dominant conception has usually been that it is the seat of morally "higher" faculties. Virtually all students of the subject, regardless of what else they have said, have meant that the biological essence of the activity of the forebrain is the production of whatever is "highest" in the moral behavior of mankind. This view in itself represents perhaps the full flower of "highest" brain function because it attests the aspirations of those who hold it. Also, it indicates a need to localize human need, longing, and hope somewhere in the body. It appears to be natural to place them in that part—the brain—which is responsible for our grandiose position in the scale of evolution.

One may quarrel with this view of brain function only because it is too wishful and insufficiently analytical to help in increasing our comprehension of the brain's actual rôle. Hence it not only fails to aid us significantly in achieving our hopes but perhaps even obstructs us. The point of view, representative as it is of an articulate and lofty wish, actually clarifies neither the nature of human aspiration nor of brain function. Through it the brain becomes the church of investigators instead of the schoolhouse.

As has been indicated, the intellect, along with the functions of all other organs, can be understood best when seen in its evolutionary place. And its essential biological function appears to be not to free us from instinctive drives (the needs of hunger, sex, attack, flight, and perhaps some others),[2] but to help us manifest them, in what for the animal kingdom is an unusually elaborate and well disguised way. The intellect enables us to do what all animals must do to survive. But we can do these things on a scale infinitely extended, complex, facile, and flexible. The intellect has evolved as a tool for the expression in a biologically new manner of the most fundamental instinctive needs, serving as it does such requirements as those of hunger, protection, and escape. Our bodies lack many of the parts and capacities often so highly de-

[2] I am not defining instinct further here, nor is it necessary for the purposes of this paper.

veloped in other forms. We are without the lion's strength, claws, and teeth, the snake's poison, the turtle's shell, the porcupine's quill, the antelope's speed. But the human intellect, with its inventions, has enabled man to imitate or substitute for all of those properties. We make bars and derricks stronger than a lion, bullets more usable than his teeth, poison more potent than the cobra's, houses that are better than a shell or a tunnel in many ways, aeroplanes for speed. The intellect is, as a general substitute for the special somatic properties of many forms, potentially a perfect biological success. Trotter has said:

> If a series of animals of increasing brain power be examined, it will be found that a growth of intelligence, while it does nothing to enfeeble the instinctive impulse, modifies the appearances of it by increasing the number of modes of reaction it may use. Intelligence, that is to say, leaves its possessor no less impelled by instinct than his simpler ancestor, but endows him with the capacity to respond in a larger variety of ways. The response is now no longer directly and narrowly confined to a single path, but may follow a number of indirect and intricate ways; there is no reason, however, to suppose that the impulse is any the weaker for that. To mistake indirectness of response for enfeeblement of impulse is a fundamental error to which all inquiry into the psychology of instinct is liable.
>
> To man, his big brain has given a maximal power of various response which enables him to indulge his instinctive impulses in indirect and symbolic activities to a greater extent than any other animal.[3]

In addition, we have ingenuity, a quality which the intellect does not share with either the shell of the turtle or the muscular power of the lion. Immense ingenuity was required gradually to work out the conception of collective living, and to produce cities to do it in, with no beasts of prey, with houses that can not burn, streets which can not be flooded, food and water free from infection, and myriads of other factors which could yield almost perfect safety from primeval threats, were we to decide to use them fully. The ingenuity which produced the electric light, the telephone, and the radio is staggering to contemplate. And, of course, we have also employed that same ingenuity to devise equally potent instruments of destruction.

Coincidentally with, and as a part of, the maturing of these immense intellectual accomplishments, society and civilization have become formulated. Our civilization may be thought of, with biological meaning, as an ingenious intellectual device for protection from and attack upon environmental perils, and for the development of individual prowess. Possibly only coincidentally came the recognition that harmonious group living was essential for the

[3] Trotter, W., *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, The Macmillan Co., 1916, p. 97.

meeting of these ends. The creation of civilization is the most conspicuous example of the employment of the intellect for the biological purposes which have been discussed, acting as the supplanter of the strength of the lion and the shell of the turtle.

It is not surprising then to find both the human intellect and its creature, civilization, used as a means not of prohibiting but of expressing instinctive urges. We often hear about "this so-called civilization"—and "man's uncivilized behavior in 'civilized' society." Biologically speaking, the paradox implied in these statements does not exist. The thing we actually have *is* the civilization our brains have naturally created. The statements mean nothing but the confusion of those who do not distinguish between the abstract, intellectualized wish and the actual, real working process of the intellect, operating as it does as almost the sole tool and interpreter of the instincts.

Is relatively unremitting expression of primitive instinctive requirements really still essential in a state of civilization, or is the practice of it merely vestigial, like the vermiform appendix? Is it requisite that man's ingenuity be brought to bear, almost in its totality, upon that sort of vent? If it is really necessary, it may as well be conceded that the human intellect is the supplanter not of the turtle's shell alone, but of the canine teeth of the sabre-toothed tiger, and of the hugeness of the dinosaur, as well, and that, unless there is an evolutionary change, mankind, with the sabre-toothed tiger and the dinosaur, is headed for extinction through the hypertrophy of his most favorable biological quality.

There is also evidence of another kind, evidence which indicates that this continuous, indirect satisfaction of primitive aspirations is not biologically essential. Attribution to the brain of all that is "highest" in man's economy in itself testifies, although almost mutely, that the intellect can conceive of a state of freedom from the necessity of living almost entirely by primordial urges. So do the various taboos laid down by almost every culture. And so do man's wails and pleas for a happier life, since the beginning of history. The intellect is able to imagine a condition in which it, itself, can rest in peace while still living. Thus it shows a fundamental difference between itself and the turtle's shell. By such fantasies the intellect reveals itself as the instrument—and it is the only possible instrument—by which mankind can possibly rescue itself from the extinctive ravages of a spinal cord, brain stem, and thalamus made more rampant than those of a lion by the ingenious rationalizations of the intellect itself.

It would seem that rescue might be possible through frank understanding of the rôle the intellect plays as the robot of the instincts,

by knowing that in the intellect we have a tool which could be used for comprehending the instincts and going about their management in a more knowing way.

The intellect, visualizing its own products as external realities, takes characteristic refuge in its own invention that the world is actually a collection of "isms." In its reliance upon such concrete externalities as "isms" the intellect has come to believe that all our troubles are, for example, economic. Many think that with the devising of better economic arrangements life would be happy and complete for almost everyone. Economic classes are thought of as biological realities. Fantastically expensive experiments in varying forms of government are still considered potential complete solutions to the problems of mankind. In that way we reveal our continued pursuit of externally achieved happiness, manufactured in happiness factories directed by technicians of human contentment.

But "isms" are not basic phenomena of nature like the electron; they are merely cortical creations. Whatever the reasons are why man's own nature with its inherent capacity to trick him has been brought so meagerly to his attention, he has gained sufficiently little by the other processes he has employed. After all is said and done, his own ingenuity has now (1943) brought him back to the primitive place he started from. Either he will have to wait idly for evolution to take care of him—unless he renders himself extinct while waiting—or he must turn to himself for an earlier answer.

(3) *The Evolutionary Forebrain and the Human Ego.* This, or so it seems to a neurologist, is the background upon which our personalities, and also our civilization, are developed. There would be no way by which we could escape from the outside limits of the function of our own brains. Everything has had to be done and always will have to be done within those limits.

The concepts of brain function just outlined are general, but they represent or underlie the general format of that component of behavior which is human. We may isolate some specific characteristics of that behavior as they appear in our society. Their relation to these more general principles of brain function and to the origin and rôle of values in society will be made clear as they are described.

The Ego. First is the ego and its usages and functions. In considering the ego, we must remember that we mean the ego as an example of human behavior derived from and expressed by the functionary evolutionary brain as it has just been described. For our purposes we could paraphrase the word "ego" in a number of ways. We could speak of it as the self, and broaden the idea to

self-consciousness, or consciousness of the self; or self-importance or the self-evident importance of the self.

Or the self-evident importance of the instinctive needs of each self. The presumptive roots of the ego in a forebrain which developed by survival value are not difficult to trace. Those primitive instincts which are served by the cortex are as personal as any part of the organism. That is, in themselves they are not personal in the usual sense of the word, shared as they are by every vertebrate. But they are personalized by the cortex. Through the cortex, they become identified as one's own, through the cortex their importance to the self also becomes recognizable as self-evident. These instincts are equally important to each individual living vertebrate for its survival, but alone, our cortex enables us to know that importance. *The intellectual identification of such instincts or drives and their importance as our own, is part of our identification of ourselves.*

Thus, that same function of the intellect by which it is the lackey of primordial instincts, gives us our identification of ourselves. And by enabling us to identify ourselves by deep instincts whose drive we feel, it adds a feeling of importance to that identification. That feeling of importance is not questioned; it is self-evident to each individual.

We are, therefore, born with an apparatus designed to give each one of us a sense of the biological importance of his own ego as he identifies it. The intellect is quite able to elaborate this self-evident and undisputed sense of importance.

The importance of that physical apparatus operating in this manner is incalculable in determining how we proceed to develop our values. It would seem that all values would either have to be derived from these operations which give us our sense of self-importance, or at least be related to them.

These cortical operations are aided by an additional bodily organ which has a special bearing in the identification of the self and on all its interrelationships. That organ is the skin. The skin has many functions; one of them is to serve as the anatomical boundary of the self. Everything on one side of the skin is to be identified in one way; everything on the other side in another. Almost everything on the far side of the skin is foreign and if not a potential threat, at least less precious than what is within it. Objects on opposite sides of the skin require totally different treatment, and are measured by different scales of values.

Relative Stereotypy of the Performance of Individual Brains. Its Similarity to Cultural Stereotypies. Some other facts should be kept in mind. The human cortex contains altogether about

twelve billion cells. Most of them are interconnected and the number of possible interconnections is, of course, enormous. Yet, all of human experience shows that brains act with a stereotypy which, in the face of such numbers, is astonishing. In clinical psychiatry we see this demonstrated constantly. Patients stress the fact that they differ from the rest of the community and bemoan it. Ordinarily what they seek is to be like everyone else. We observe the same thing vividly in children. They tend to go into panic states if their dress differs from that of the other children. They are unhappy if the accent of their speech differs or if there is a variance between the viewpoints of their parents and those of others. Sometimes even parental superiority in social or economic status is disturbing to children because it makes them different from their associates.

This need to be like others shows itself in the cohesion of groups. Groups form wherever there are people.[4] Groups divide into subgroups, drawn by common desires, thoughts, philosophies, needs. Within those subgroups, thinking, behaving, dressing, eating, the various processes of living, and the ways of using leisure time are strikingly uniform, the variations being relatively scattered and constituting distinct minorities. Even in the domain of the pathological, this is true. The infinite variety of the human personality seems not to apply to the basic categories of behavior as they exist, but to details within those categories.

This capacity or even need for one brain to act like another is a prerequisite to the existence of any order in society and of cultural similarities and cultural differences. We ask whether groups of people think alike, have common evaluations, and whether a group can have relative uniformity of its personalities. We should be asking whether it could possibly be otherwise. All of our historical, sociological, and anthropological experience, in combination with our neurological and psychiatric experience, would show that the answer to the second question is negative.

The basis of the stereotypies evolved by any culture is the development of values out of which came the customs and institutions by which the people in that particular culture live. *The least dispensable are, directly, those for the expression and management of what we spoke of before as the ego, in individuals: the consciousness of the self, the importance of the self, and consciousness of the importance of the self.* And community by community, most individuals will tend to adhere to the ego-expressive stereotypies prescribed by cultural dictate and assume, again by self-evidence, that that is the natural and right way to live. This is the same as

[4] Trotter, W., *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.*

to say that each group establishes its own stereotypies for the thalamo-frontal relationship.

I do not mean to say that there are no individual variations in the relationship between frontal lobes and thalamus. Even these, though, tend to form themselves into groups, in which the individual variations tend to diminish. For example: once the frontal lobes are entirely thalamic lackeys, and again they rebel and stress the dream of how it could be different. This may be the meaning of James's grouping of tender-minded and tough-minded people. An enormous and complicated body of factors goes into the difference between the two. One can ask whether the difference represents something like a difference between two species, or at least a great and significant variation. Or whether the tender-minded is the guilty one who rebels against tough-minded tendencies because he has been taught (frontally taught) that they are wrong. Or whether it is a matter of various glandular interplays upon the brain. We can not answer these questions today.

All that has been said so far can be summarized in the statement that an organically fixed foundation for a strong sense of ego-importance is accepted by self-evidence and that modes for the expression of this self-importance are stereotyped into customs and institutions by every culture. In every group there are deviants, who in turn usually form themselves into subgroups.

If we were to leave the subject at this point, we would end on a most discouraging note. This, fortunately, is not necessary. The very organ which has caused the situation has been able to do one other vital thing, of which we have spoken. It has been able to imagine a condition in which many of the disquiets of life, most of which it can see as unnecessary, do not exist. But it has failed to invent effective devices for making these fantasies real.

Perhaps this is because it has lacked the requisite knowledge. Methods employed to "improve" human behavior have revolved essentially around preaching, emulation, frightening, and punishing. These methods have developed partly from lack of sufficient knowledge, partly from the need to be concrete and specific. Overt acts of behavior have always appeared concrete and specific—far more so than the causes of the acts. But the acts are in reality nothing but symptoms. And when, because they were conspicuous and concrete, we treated the acts, we were doing what a doctor would do if he administered morphine to relieve the pain, and failed to remove the appendix. None of these procedures takes into account, or is oriented by, that understanding of the biology of the brain without which we can do nothing but stumble among secondary values.

Sometimes it is claimed that these historic methods have worked. It is said that they have been effective with most people. Granted that they have made the majority good inmates of society. What of the minorities? And what of that majority? What is there to indicate that they, by obedience to the mores of our civilization, have evolved a condition that is comfortable for them, or that evokes those combinations of the brain which would yield maximal health and contentment? What can be said for a society in which during the best of times there are squalid poverty, poverty-born disease, under-education with a large illiteracy rate even in this country; when every physician knows that the need of psychiatric help is so great that if every doctor were a psychiatrist, the surface would still not be scratched; when 7–8 per cent of the young men of America are too neurotic to be able to serve in the armed forces and when nine to eleven million people are known to be having psychiatric care at this time, by a conservative estimate and without regard to those who have needed it in the past and who are still living; when death can be so commonly welcomed that Osler called pneumonia "the old man's friend"? Such observations as these, let alone our periodic breakdowns into cataclysms of war, indicate that our approaches to human behavior leave something to be desired.

The Ego as It Appears in Socially Institutionalized Form. What specific types of step could be envisaged aiming toward alleviation? The question can be approached by considering the ego again, this time as it actually shows in civilization, and particularly in terms of the usages we give it in our society. "Usages" really means our customs and institutions for the care and expression of the individual ego. In considering this, we must always keep in mind the organic foundations of the ego already discussed. We can view this question by observing some of the unhappy products of these institutions; these carry with them implications of treatment.

(1) *Social Values as Standards for Ego Manipulation. Some Consequences of Our Usage of These Standards.* Probably the most usual of all institutions is the very setting up of cultural standards, standards of emotion and behavior (notably not of intellect). The mere existence of any standards at all at once means that the standards are going to be unattainable by a great many. Those who come closest to attainment will incorporate the accomplishment into their collection of ego adornments. This immediately tends to cause the standards to become false ones for others.

That is true because the thing then to be aimed at by those who have fallen short is no longer the original standard in itself, but

one as expressed by the satisfied individual of attainment. The goal still masquerades as a standard to achieve, when it has been changed to something else. This is confusing to those who still have their achieving to do and serves as one cause of inferiority feeling, of envy and of embattlement between one ego and another. It is but one example of the innumerable hate-brewing situations into which we constantly blindly fall.

I chose standards as an example for another reason as well. This perfectly automatic, and virtually axiomatic, misuse of standards which must exist carries its intrinsic unhealthy effects considerably farther. Almost by definition, the local standards must be accepted by most individuals, community by community and culture by culture. For those to whom their acceptance comes easiest, they are a source of rigid influence over the behavior of others. Many of these others, finding after a time that the kind of adherence they have been taught is impossible for them, come to consider themselves no good at all, drop all effort, and join the frankly antisocial component. Others become psychoneurotic or suffer explosions of the neurotic trends which made conformity difficult in the first place.

These outcomes are so extremely common that the question forces itself upon our attention. Attention may be called again to the 7–8 per cent of men coming up for induction, who were too neurotic to be taken into the armed forces. To this must be added the large number who mistakenly pass the induction examination, only to break down shortly after going to camp. Also to be added are the unknown but large number rejected or discharged because of psychosomatic illnesses such as gastric ulcer and hypertension. From all of the figures I have given, it is justified to doubt whether it is abnormal to have difficulty in keeping up with the Joneses. If it is not abnormal to get sick with the effort, then clearly something will have to be changed.

Some of the actual standards we have are also biologically false, at least under the usages just described which we are bound to give all standards, built as we are. One of these was demonstrated after women obtained the vote in this country and began to enter careers outside their homes. Many women did it brilliantly. Others, and this continued to be seen until the war broke out, found that they had no native capacity for outside work and had to remain at home. But, as might have been expected under the aegis of such a brain and such derivative institutions as I have described, a certain proportion of the home-women could not happily accept this status. They felt inferior to the other women, struggled hopelessly to emulate them, accentuated whatever neurotic trends they had or de-

veloped new ones, and became incapacitated for the work at home they were otherwise well fitted to do.

The same result of the misuse of standards is revealed again by the difficulties in which large numbers of our young men find themselves because of rejection from the armed forces for neuropsychiatric reasons. Very many of them were previously well-respected, hard-working, competent, sometimes conspicuously constructive and valuable individuals. As a rule, after rejection, they develop severe feelings of inferiority and shame, and these feelings are, on the whole, encouraged by the community. They have suddenly become considered the eccentric, the misfitting, the odd, and even the dangerous. Jobs they once filled more than adequately, they can not obtain now. There is "something the matter with them." It may be no more than is the matter with their prospective employer or with the girl who will have nothing to do with them, but they have been marked as being "different," and by that marking, a new "inferior" component of society has been created. A pack of animals will sometimes tear a wounded animal to pieces and I have seen it happen among dogs. In human society, such operations frequently result in new and acute outbreaks of psychoneurotic illness.

(2) *Shame.* Out of these processes come specifically the sense of shame, among other things. Questions concerning shame were raised recently by Helen Lynd, and discussed by Margaret Mead.[5] Mrs. Lynd recognized that we have no apparatus for the dissipation of shame. It is, indeed, possible for a shamed man to set himself right before God, but it is very difficult to do so before man.

Experiences, again with rejectees, have shown how vital and profound a problem this is. Cases are not rare in which, after neurotic trends or unfortunate acts are brought to light by the induction investigation, the man is even ashamed to face a doctor who might help him.

One such case was that of N. T., aged 22. He had had to admit homosexual interests. He had never engaged in any overt homosexual act. He was sent to a consultant by the Induction Station, so that the question of his fitness for the army could be studied more intensely. He was obviously too neurotic altogether to be inducted. In the presence of the consultant he was timid and reluctant to look up, and wept with shame. The consultant took a therapeutic attitude and informed N. T. that many excellent clinical facilities were available by which he could receive psychological assistance which might be of immense value to him. N. T. was greatly interested and indicated that he longed for help. He

[5] Mead, Margaret, *And Keep Your Powder Dry.* Wm. Morrow & Co., 1942.

said he felt that he could not bring himself to confront another doctor. The consultant suggested that N. T. return for another talk with him, thinking that he might be better able to help N. T. bridge the chasm between himself and help. He was eager to come, but when the time arrived, he could not get himself to confront the consultant himself again.

In another instance, the essential difficulties were of a different nature; again the registrant could not face the consultant, but wrote him a letter, of which the following is an excerpt:

Dear Doctor,

I am sorry that I did not call you up the day you told me to do so, more sorry than I could express in a letter. I want you to know doctor that I thought men of your kind don't exist any more but I guess I was wrong. I was really ashamed to face you again after I left you the last time.

I wish to god in heaven that I met men like you years back. For I really believed you when you told me you wanted to help me for I hate to believe different. Doctor I hope you don't think me writing this sort of a letter is kiddish but I just had to do it.

Another facet of the same immense subject was illustrated in a case seen by the writer in 1931. The individual, Luke M., aged 19, was a prisoner in the New York State School for Delinquent Boys at Warwick. Trips to Warwick were part of a project in which the Medical Center participated. Luke was one of the bad inmates, distinguished from most of the others by physical dirtiness, slovenly dress, surliness, generalized hostility, and he refused to obey regulations. He was one of the few who did not swear he was "going straight" after his release; instead he proclaimed, with some insolence, that he would be as bad as possible. His home had literally been in the street; at night he would often have to lie down on the sidewalk and go to sleep.

My monthly talks with him soon became virtually limited to a discussion of what I took to be the one thought that had ever provoked him. It was a question: "Why do you come up here once a month and when you do, why do you spend an hour with me?" None of the explanations I could give satisfied him; I was not a police officer and I was not paid, and my visits were incomprehensible. The sixth such visit was marked by the same insistent questioning. In the end I answered him: "I guess it's because I like you, Luke; I respect you." He stood up, leaning toward me, and cried out with great feeling, "Say that again!" I repeated it and he answered with an oath "No one ever said that to me before!"

Luke thereupon became a model inmate of Warwick, starting that afternoon. He became spruce, happy, and friendly and helped in the contract work being done by outside electricians, at 75 cents

a day, a thing he had sullenly refused to do before. On my next visit he actually made the remark "I never knew it could be fun to work."

An accurate follow-up study could not be made because of lack of facilities. All that is known is that for something over two years after Luke's release he had a perfectly satisfactory record at a C.C.C. camp. However he is now in prison, serving a term for grand larceny.

Singular as this case is in its circumstances, experience has shown it to be common in principle.

The lesson in these cases is a mortal one.

Possibilities of Treatment. What possible suggestions for the better treatment of humanity by humans may be picked out of this outline? Our employment of the ego, as it arises from its organic foundations, has not been happy. It appears that we have developed a society upon the cornerstone of ego capitalism. Some specific consequences of our cerebrosocial setup which have also been touched upon call for remedying. An outstanding example of these is Lynd's observation that we possess no machinery for resolving shame. Study should be given to this matter specifically, and quite possibly a solution could be worked out. But that question is, of course, only a symptom in a much more comprehensive condition and it may be easier to envisage treatment of the condition itself, than of even its most important symptom. And it is wiser to treat the whole foundation rather than to focus upon a single symptom out of its context.

This more profound treatment must center around a new kind of learning for all of us. It was Pope who said "The proper study of mankind is man." But since Pope thought it pointed to make that statement which, evidently, was no more self-evident then than now, Darwin and Freud in particular have found keys to the structure of man of which we could make far more fruitful use.

Psychoanalysis has dissected out in detail many of the precise ways in which the forebrain functions as I have described it, as the rationalizing executor of primitive instincts. I do not believe most psychoanalysts regard the brain in the way I have dealt with it here, and they might raise objections to the terminology just employed. In any event, psychoanalysis has disclosed typical ways in which the western forebrain operates, whatever the point of view which is regarded as fundamental. One additional fact which that discipline has revealed is this: When an individual patient under psychoanalysis discovers with his forebrain what tricks that forebrain is playing on him, those tricks frequently disappear, and a healthier use of the whole brain may be substituted.

Psychoanalysis is brought into this discussion because of the methodology it has taught us. It has shown that the acquiring of critical facts by a patient frequently dispels the illness. Society could borrow that approach from psychoanalysis, using it in a different way and with a far broader, though basically similar, purpose.

(1) *Aims.* But in working with a patient, customarily we tend to see him only as an individual, or perhaps as one of a social group. We probably never regard him as a member of a species. That omission costs us the opportunity to consider and explore psychological conflicts arising from the evolutionary status of the cortex and the rest of the brain. And for the patient to see himself merely as an isolated, troubled individual, related to others only by inferiority, deprives him of the chance to recognize that he belongs to a species one of the special capacities of which is to get into just his kind of trouble. Grasping this idea can be more than an encouragement to a patient. It can be helpful in a broader, educative sense.

For that purpose, certain classes of questions need stating and answering; questions which puzzle most individuals in a vague, unknowing sort of way.

If all human brains are intrinsically patterned to perform the functions outlined, how are these brains trained to perform them in different parts of the world? The methods of relating the intellect to the instincts differ, culture by culture. By what means have goals and methods of repression and expression been caused to differ? In our own culture, many of the schemes of right and wrong we have invented actually conflict with each other, as Mead has shown.[6] In the culture within which a given patient lives, what has gone into the brains of parents, brothers, sisters, friends, and others further and further toward the periphery of the patient's community? What has gone into these brains to make these people apparently think alike? To make them a certain, definite kind of person, quite different from some other definite kind of person who lives 10,000 miles away? To make them seem like individuals who can meet standards of achievement and adjustment the patient seems to stumble on? Are those standards immutably right? Are these "rights" goals of achievement necessarily right or are there apparently happy communities where the aims of achievement are totally different?

Questions like these can not be shrugged off. Their mere reality requires a re-evaluation of the meaning of standards and their

[6] Mead, Margaret, *And Keep Your Powder Dry.*

usage. The ultimate answer is not to do away with standards; our species has shown amply that it can not get along without them.

But their usage is another matter. They, like anything else, are harmful when misused and some of the evils of that misuse have been touched upon. A more acute knowledge of what standards mean in terms of the organic ego could lead us to handle them quite differently—temper them with more mercy, for example, and thus to create less opposition to them.

2. *General Method.* Even deeper than that is the actual character of the standards themselves, as they develop and congeal. All over the world cultural aims and values have always developed spontaneously, and the result has always been locally regarded as the only right.

The organically fixed foundations of the ego can not be changed. But, through the intelligent application of knowledge, the usages of the ego and the values which support those usages could be altogether altered. Is there a way in which newly developing values might evolve not in a haphazard manner, but on the foundation of fact?

I believe there might be, but not by conferences followed by legislation. Nothing has ever happened to suggest that there might be anything but folly in that method. But the raising of this question brings up another of our troubles—our tendency to cling to categories, considering the categories as realities; to think in an either-or manner; to choose between the categories we have, without regard to any possible wrongness in all of them. In this particular case, we are not limited to choosing between laissez-faire and legislation; there is another possibility. *If the brains of the young were caused to contain some facts about the nature of man, it could result in the spontaneous development of an altogether healthier cultural and individual life.* The hints in this direction that have been gained from experience with individual psychotherapy have been indicated. The brain is a dependable organ, and can turn raw materials into magnificent structures. I am now speaking of supplying it with a certain specific kind of raw material—facts.

The facts I mean are those related to the most interesting of all subjects to man—the nature of man. We could teach, for example, the significance of the organically founded ego and its rôle in human relations, including international relations, which, too, are nothing but human; the primitive drives and the predominant use of the forebrain in rationalizing their expression through which we help ourselves to escape the responsibility for our fate by placing the burden on "isms" or any other external factor we can

get our brains on; the formation and development of the human personality and of the chief classifiable forms to which, descriptively, personalities cleave in their formation in our society. Much could profitably be taught about love, hate, envy, passivity, and aggression, about consciousness and unconsciousness of emotion and thought, and the proportions of rationality and irrationality by which the world is actually run.

Another way of stating the same thing is to say that we would teach in school the same kind of factual material we now teach patients undergoing psychotherapy. Psychotherapy itself is a form of education; but it is done post-graduately and that is late. The kind of educative principle that I am proposing could be called preventive psychotherapy; it would be real mental hygiene. In these procedures we could bring psychotherapeutic advantages within the reach of greater numbers of people, and individuals at large and also the group they comprise could perhaps achieve through learning the same benefit as a patient—reduction in conflicts, more intelligent usage of the ego and of values, greater emotional balance, more health.

To the degree to which the method succeeded, post-graduate teaching of the same type would be unnecessary. For the most practical reasons, some such step has got to be worked out and employed, because the number of actual, and even potential, psychotherapists does not begin to cover the need.

If properly presented, the study of man, included in the study of nature, need not seem like an unnatural addition to the three R's. As seen in the imagination, it has a much healthier appearance than our present educational approach, which is a hushing one. A cardinal rule is to teach children away from any knowledge of their biological selves. With our present system, the saga of the ego and its usages would sound like Sanskrit, to pupils and teacher alike. Discipline and syrup are poured upon the more unpleasant urges until the stew of illusion is perfected. Later, adolescents typically reach "the stage of disillusionment" which means nothing more than the discovery that what they were taught about themselves and others is not true. It would be healthier, instead of smiling a sentimental tear over disillusionment, to stop planning it in advance. Children could be safely educated about themselves from the beginning, did we not fear their knowing too much about their superiors. They could still be free to have some illusions, but about less important matters than the nature of the world and its inhabitants.[7]

[7] Frank, Lawrence K., "The Reorientation of Education to the Promotion of Mental Hygiene," *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. XXIII (1939), No. 4.

When an adolescent enters his disillusionment, ordinarily he has no fixed, faith-giving truths to turn to. Nothing comparable to his old illusions is presented as a substitute. Freed from the anchor of his illusions, he may seize upon the most convenient, superficial, possibly merely commercial values, or he may float without values or purpose and never again attain an anchorage. Often his preparation has made him a fit subject for a psychiatrist. Ordinarily he does not get to a psychiatrist, but grows on into the world and takes his part, little or big, in running it.

The development of an educative point of view such as this one could equip future human beings whose brains have not yet been constructed with a factual foundation for life far more practical than anything we have dreamed of. As adults, such people could be trusted to forge new, realistic, biologically consonant values, with which such a being as the human could live with eventual maximal intelligence and health.

RICHARD M. BRICKNER

NEW YORK CITY

BOOK REVIEW

Popular Freethought in America, 1825–1850. ALBERT POST. (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, No. 497.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1943. 258 pp. $3.00.

American Freethought, 1860–1914. SIDNEY WARREN. (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, No. 504.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1943. 257 pp. $3.00.

These two volumes fill a genuine need in the intellectual history of America. Here, for the first time, is a connected story of the battle which freethinkers waged from 1825 to 1914. It is a story worth telling of a movement led by men who, in the main, were characterized by a passion for liberty and deep intellectual honesty. As one reads the record it is hard to decide which is the stronger impression, the extent to which the leaders failed or the degree of influence which we can now see they had upon the intellectual life of America. For I suppose every one of the outstanding figures would have been regarded by his contemporaries, and perhaps by himself, as having been unsuccessful in the spread of freethought. By most objective tests there was more dogmatic religion in 1900 than in 1825, and certainly the freethought movement was almost dead. Yet the substance of so much that they had fought for, a deeper respect for reason and for the results of science, a stronger belief in the capacities of man, and an insistence

on the necessity of focusing our attention upon the human scene, has come to be an accepted part of our intellectual climate.

Mr. Post's volume dealing with the period from 1825 to 1860 is particularly rich in its portrayal of the unique figures associated with the early freethought movement. Frances Wright, Robert Owen, Robert Dale Owen, Abner Kneeland, Benjamin Offen, and Gilbert Vale are all persons worthy of being much better known than their lack of orthodoxy has permitted.

The central question raised is concerned with the creed of the early freethinkers; or, more explicitly, what was freethought? It was decidedly not atheism. The creed of Samuel Ludvigh, which Mr. Post believes to have been characteristic of freethinkers, "included a belief in a God, the perfection of his creation, the immortality of the soul, that true religion is to do good to one's fellow men, that Christ was mortal, and that priestcraft is the curse of mankind; and a disbelief in miracles and prophecies."

The freethinkers seem to have been the children of the Enlightenment, and to have held most of the beliefs and attitudes of that period. They accepted Reason and Nature as their twin gods, attacked authority and revelation, and continued to hold those aspects of Christianity which were consonant with their religion of nature. They had unlimited optimism regarding human nature. They believed in the possibilities of all men, with the possible exception of the clergy; they could find nothing favorable to say in behalf of their greatest enemies.

Mr. Post makes clear that there was at least one sharp difference between the movements in Europe and America. Whereas in Europe infidelity flourished largely among the wealthy and educated, in the United States it was among the masses that the movement found its roots. The Rev. Robert Baird is quoted as saying that "open infidelity . . . has descended to the lower ranks. It now burrows in the narrow streets, and lanes, and purlieus of our large cities and towns, where it finds its proper aliment—the ignorant and the vicious, to mislead and to destroy." But if its roots were among the laboring people there was far less connection between freethought and labor movements than might be expected. Both Mr. Post and Mr. Warren make clear that while many socialists were infidels, there were not many of the latter who were socialists. Mr. Warren is particularly concerned with this fact and critical of the freethinkers because of it. He points out that they might have been expected to participate in all liberal movements aimed against repression and coercion, but that this was not the case. The socialists were far more consistent, for they realized that both tyranny and liberalism are indivisible.

The essential difference between the socialist and the "organizational" freethinker was that the former viewed religion in the context of a whole social pattern and not as an isolated phenomenon. The socialist was anti-religious insofar as religion in his eyes was a bulwark of that system which he endeavored to destroy. The "dogmatic" freethinker, on the other hand, condemned religion, not because it was an impediment to the achievement of any specific political and economic system, but because it resulted in the enslavement of man's mind. In short, the one possessed an integrated view of life based upon a clearly defined analysis of society of which anti-religion was one facet. The other was interested in the struggle against religion as the be-all and end-all of his ideological crusade.[1]

One question raised by Mr. Post, but never adequately answered, relates to the rise and fall of the movement. Why were there certain periods, from 1775 to 1800, from 1825 to 1850, when freethinkers were far more prevalent? Why were there other times when the movement was so weak? In 1800 the emotionalism of the widespread revivals proved too much for the freethinkers; around 1825 there was a decided increase of interest in the issues. By 1850 most of the enthusiasm of the 1830's had vanished. Why? Mr. Post might well have concerned himself more fully with that question.

Mr. Warren in his treatment of the later period is less descriptive than Mr. Post, but he is more philosophical in his concern with the underlying assumptions, and he gives a wider perspective. Freethought from 1860 to 1914 had far fewer outstanding figures associated with it; Ingersoll and Darrow are the only well-known names. Futhermore, the period was marked by a tremendous growth in church attendance which would seem to indicate a definite decline in infidelity.

Mr. Warren makes it clear, however, that the entire issue has to be put into a new setting. From the middle of the nineteenth century the scientific background was no longer that of the Enlightenment but sprang from the work of Darwin and Huxley. It was inevitable that the theory of evolution should challenge the theological thought of America, and have special significance for the freethought movement. The cause of evolution found cordial supporters among freethinkers, but the interesting thing is that it was men like Fiske and Youmans, who never broke with organized religion, yet who were more effective in breaking down the restrictions of orthodoxy than were the heterodox. Mr. Warren is emphatic in his insistence on the extent to which Fiske undermined conventional religious thought through his efforts to have evolution accepted, and thereby served the cause of freethought.

With this change in scientific atmosphere it is not surprising that

[1] Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

the creed of the freethinkers should have changed somewhat. Mr. Warren characterizes the beliefs of the majority as follows:

> Firstly, they believe that the scientific method is the only acceptable one for determining the validity of reasoning. Secondly, they are agnostic in the sense that they will believe nothing except that which is proven by science. Thirdly, they affirm the intelligibility of the universe, but do not attribute that intelligibility to immanent creation or transcendent design. The universe, it is argued, is not moral in design, or immoral; it is simply unconnected with morals. Ethical standards arise not from the compassion or wisdom of a Supreme Being, but from man's actions towards his fellow-man as he advances in the march of human progress. Finally, freethought is secular in character. Freethinkers believe that all human motivation should be inspired by the exigencies of the situation on earth, and not be conditioned by a concern with a future life. They are convinced that man's welfare can best be served by the total separation of Church and State—complete non-interference by the Church in politics and correspondingly, no aid or encouragement by the State to the Church.
>
> . . . To a world dominated by religious sentiment, they would offer one in which the spirit of scientific inquiry would prevail; instead of superstition, rational thought; and in place of the supernatural, the natural. Instead of the "futility of prayer," they proposed the intelligent application of hands and brain to improve the welfare of society through socially useful pursuits.[2]

But within that general framework there was decided divergence. Three separate groups are identified. There were the conservatives united in the Free Religious Movement. They had broken with orthodox theology in their insistence on the supreme place of reason, but they were the heirs of transcendentalism as preached by Emerson and Parker and so remained at once "freethinking and religious." "In short, as Free Religionists saw it, the cornerstone of Christianity was faith in Christ, while that of Free Religion was faith in human nature; the great institution of the former was the Christian Church; the latter was the Commonwealth of Man, its supreme constitution being man's universal conscience."

A second group was composed of the agnostics. They were the men who were most profoundly impressed with the inability of man to answer questions of ultimate destiny. In Spencer's words: "Deep down in the very nature of life the relativity of our knowledge is discernible. The analysis of vital actions in general leads not only to the conclusion that things in themselves cannot be known to us; but also to the conclusion that knowledge of them, were it possible, would be useless." One man in America did more to popularize this view than any other—Robert Ingersoll. His famous lecture entitled "Why Am I An Agnostic?" while not as scholarly as the writings of some of the philosophers, reached a far

[2] Warren, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–21.

wider audience, and convinced thousands of the impossibility of having any absolute religious knowledge.

The third group included those who characterized themselves as atheists. Their essential tenets might be summarized as a denial of the infallibility and divine inspiration of the Bible, and an insistence on the authority of reason. There was a denial of any element of the supernatural, and a complete reliance upon natural science. The universe was not governed by God but by immutable laws, with a resulting denial of the efficacy of prayer. It is through human effort that progress can be achieved, and the responsibility for it is solely on man's shoulders. There was a denial of any connection between mortality and religion, since morality is a matter between man and man, and not between man and God. It was the human scene which was the center for man's activities and the source of whatever hope he might have.

As one tries to survey the results of these ninety years of dissent it is clear that there were at least two more or less new factors which came into the picture. In the first place, while science had had decided influence, the work of that century had an enormous influence upon man's thinking. As Mr. Warren points out, new discoveries in physics provided a naturalistic explanation of many hitherto mysterious processes, while evolution became a principle of interpretation in almost every area of thought. This new science created a scepticism about many issues previously undoubted; "scientific inquiry displaced conformity, and doubt supplanted unquestioning orthodoxy."

The second major influence was the growing industrialism. Man's economic problems became more acute, partly because he was less easily convinced that he should postpone his security until another life. If there was not to be a heaven where ills might be righted it was all the more imperative that he should not allow the machine which he had invented to turn this world into a present hell. It was to this latter changing pattern that the freethinkers never adjusted themselves. The dominant enemy still remained the reactionary theological forces, even when it was clear that the influence of the latter was waning. "There were so many iniquities demanding immediate correction, that concentration upon an exaggerated theological oppressiveness indicated a certain visionary quality. Like some religious zealots who directed their attention to a far-off heaven rather than an earthly society, the apostles of freethought attacked the citadel of religion while the forces of mundane rapaciousness needed to be checked."

How much influence did the freethinkers have? To what extent did they help to bring a more scientifically oriented intellectual

climate? It is to be questioned whether they had great influence in bringing about the scepticism and naturalism which have developed to so marked a degree in the scholastic world within the past half century. The emergence of the academically respectable non-conformist is due primarily to the impact of scientific thought. Nor can one be sure how much influence the freethinkers had upon the church. The walls of that institution seem to have been high enough to have kept out many of the voices from outside. The impact of freethought as a movement seems to have been neither on the academic nor on the ecclesiastical world, but on that large body of people who were outside both church and university. They were touched and affected. Within that group Mr. Warren is right in saying that the freethinkers did contribute to the growing liberalization of thought.

LAURENCE SEARS

OHIO WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

BOOK NOTES

The Structure of Normative Ethics. A. F. NELSON. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Lithoprinted by Edwards Brothers, Inc. 1943. (For sale by the *Journal of Philosophy.*) 53 pp. 85 cents.

This is an analytic study, seeking to clarify the meaning of judgments about what is intrinsically good, and to indicate the methods by which they may be confirmed or disconfirmed.

The central contention is briefly this: Certain kinds of approval are introspectively characterized and called "feelings of respect." Judgments of the form "*O* is intrinsically good" are then taken as empirically confirmed to the extent that *O* gives rise, under certain stipulated conditions, to feelings of this kind. Dr. Nelson is at pains to argue that this procedure does not reduce ethics to any one of the recognized natural sciences, such as psychology. Perhaps his reasoning can be typified by an analogy. The statement, "This material object is red," like any other empirical statement, must be confirmed by appeal to sense data; and sense data are a proper subject for psychological study; but one must not conclude, merely on this account, that "This material object is red" is itself a psychological statement. One more naturally takes it as describing the material object. Similarly, although "*O* is intrinsically good" must be confirmed by an appeal to feelings of respect, and although these feelings are open to psychological study, one need not infer that "*O* is intrinsically good" is a psychological

statement. One may take it, as Nelson does, as assigning a characteristic to *O* itself.

This terse summary is not sufficient, to be sure, to do justice to Nelson's views. His presentation, commendable for its lucidity, shows a good understanding of logic, and no little introspective sensitivity. Yet certain points are in need of much more detailed development than they receive. A reader is likely to leave the book with the feeling that he has been interested, but not quite convinced.

Perhaps the least satisfactory part of the analysis is the treatment given to "conflicts of feelings." If one group of people persistently experience *O* with respect, and another group experience it with disrespect, then is *O* intrinsically good or is it not? Nelson begins by ruling out certain cases of this sort as being partially irrelevant. If a feeling of respect is to be evidence for *O*'s intrinsic goodness, the feeling must be an innate or "spontaneous" one. Hence to whatever extent a divergence of respect is due to training, it does not constitute conflicting evidence, but only introduces a supplementary methodological problem of discounting the effects that training has had. This emphasis on spontaneous feelings is justified by the remark that a trained feeling "does not indicate anything about *O*, but only something about *A*'s aptitude as a student, his teachers' efficiency, etc." Now a question arises at this point which Nelson does not attempt to answer, and which becomes evident from continuing the parallel mentioned above. A man who at first notices an object as being simply "red" may later, after visual training, come to discriminate it more specifically as "crimson, of a low saturation and medium brightness." We believe in this case that training has not distorted his description of the object, but has made it more accurate. Why, then, does training have so different an effect on feelings of respect than it has on discriminated color sensations, and serve always to *distort* one's judgments about intrinsic value? Perhaps Nelson could show why the parallel does not hold; but so long as he does not do so, one has the discomforting suspicion that he has ruled out trained feelings not because he has reason to do so, but because they prove embarrassing to his theory.

But let us assume that further analysis could settle this point. It remains true, as Nelson clearly sees, that people may have different feelings of respect for *O* quite independently of training. In that case, he writes, there would be a conflict of evidence which is "comparable to any other conflict of evidence. . . . The sensible thing to do would be to suspend the case until further evidence arises." This may be sober counsel, but it begs the key question,

namely: *What* further evidence is required? To continue the parallel about color:

If an object seems red to *A* but not to *B*, any dispute about the actual color of the object must be decided in the light of further evidence; and here *A* and *B* are likely to agree on the kind of evidence that is relevant. Roughly, they may agree that the object will be shown to be red if it "seems red to normal eyes in sunlight." Although "normal" is a vague term, it is not so vague as to prevent their coming to agreement after appropriate inquiry. But what if *A* feels a spontaneous respect for *O* and *B* feels a spontaneous disrespect for it? If they then disagree about the intrinsic goodness of *O*, and wish to appeal to further evidence, is it so obvious that they must agree on the kind of evidence that will be decisive? It will scarcely do to have them investigate how people of a "normal" temperament will react to *O;* for in this case the stipulation needs to be more specific. People who are normal in the ordinary sense of the term may still differ sharply in the way their spontaneous respect is directed. Or if "normal" is to have some unfamiliar, narrower sense, it may then be doubted whether normal reactions can provide an adequate criterion for intrinsic value.

If Nelson can not indicate a set of criteria that will be generally accepted, he can not make certain of the bare possibility, even, of an empirically-founded moral agreement. He might, of course, introduce stipulations about the "greatest respect of the greatest number" as constituting the decisive criteria; but that seems out of the spirit of his ethics, and in any case not always convincing to the dissenting minority. Or he could say that when there is disagreement on the criteria, the ethical statement is simply ambiguous, and the issue verbal; but that might dismiss a disconcerting number of problems. Or he could say that disagreement on the criteria represents an irreducible element of relativism in ethics; but that would be an admission that greatly compromises with his contentions. No matter how he might seek to develop his views, there would be serious problems to settle; and in its present form his study leaves these problems unmentioned.

Yet Nelson's analysis is provocative, if incomplete; and it explores parallels between the methods of testing evaluative and non-evaluative statements which are in great need of the dispassionate study he has given them.

C. L. S.

The Contribution of Holland to the Sciences. A Symposium edited by A. J. BARNOUW and B. LANDHEER. New York: Querido, Inc. 1943. xvii + 373 pp. $3.50.

This book is intended as an expression of and feeder to the interest in the Netherlands which has arisen since she became one of the United Nations. It consists of twenty scholarly articles dealing with theology, philosophy, philology, psychology, sociology, historiography, law, political economy, international law, history of art, musicology, oriental studies, library science, astronomy, mathematics, physics, chemistry, medicine, botany, and architecture. These articles, while concerned to point out the contributions of the Netherlands to these various arts and fields of learning, and though written by Dutch citizens or by American citizens of Dutch descent, are sane and objective in their claims, and internationally-minded in their attitudes. Hence the book will be of interest even to those whose interest in the Netherlands is not merely chauvinistic, and to the historian of learning whose interest in the Netherlands is somewhat incidental.

The article on Philosophy by Marten ten Hoor is well done and entirely just in its estimate of Dutch philosophizing. My only complaint is that Dean ten Hoor does not mention Balthasar Bekker, one of the more interesting of the Cartesians.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

WILLIAM K. FRANKENA

OTHER NEW BOOKS AND JOURNALS

Edelstein, Ludwig: The Hippocratic Oath. Text, Translation, and Interpretation. (Supplements to the *Bulletin of the History of Medicine,* No. 1.) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1943. vii + 64 pp. $1.25.

JOURNAL OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC. Volume 9, Number 1. A set of axioms for logic: *Theodore Hailperin.*

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. Volume V, Number 2. "A Grace beyond the Reach of Art": *S. H. Monk.* The Rural Socrates: *P. H. Johnstone.* The Sociology of Religion: *Talcott Parsons.* Discussion—Geistesgeschichte vs. History of Ideas as Applied to Hitlerism: *Leo Spitzer.* Reply to Professor Spitzer: *A. O. Lovejoy.* Notes and Documents—Ficino and Pomponazzi on the Place of Man in the Universe: *P. O. Kristeller.* Translation of Ficino's *Platonic Theology: J. L. Burroughs.*

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN. Vol. XXI, No. 3. Can Philosophers Co-operate? *W. H. Sheldon.* The German Neoscholastic Approach

to Heidegger: *James Collins.* Sociology and its Philosophical Aspects: *P. H. Furfey.* The Foundations of Mechanism: *H. F. Tiblier.*

We print below a list of selected articles from the following publications:

RENAISSANCE. Volume I, Fascicule 4. Science et Monde Moderne: *Jacques Hadamard.* Doctrines d'Art au Début du XIX$^{\text{ième}}$ Siécle: *Lionello Venturi.* Vices et Vertus du Personnage O'Neillien: *Françoise Dony.* Gobineau, Juge du Fascisme: *René Etiemble.*

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM. Volume 2. Toward a Conciliation of Personalism and Behaviorism: *L. H. DeWolf.* Santayana's Thought as an Interpretation of History: *J. H. Lavely.* Governor Saltiades—A Study in Plato's *Republic: W. S. Haycock.* Value-Propositions and Empirical Verification: *S. C. Ackley.*

NOTES AND NEWS

"Authority and Freedom" is the subject of a symposium to be held by the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences at the New School for Social Research, New York, on May 7, 1944. At the morning session, devoted to "Authority and Freedom in Philosophy," the speakers will be Professor Ernest Nagel, Columbia University, on the topic "Authority in the Sciences," and Professor Leo Strauss, New School for Social Research, on the topic "Authority and Freedom in Political Philosophy." "Authority and Freedom in a Democratic Society" will be the subject of the afternoon session; the speakers are Professor Thomas Reed Powell, Law School of Harvard University, on "Constitution, Legislatures, Courts," and Judge Jerome Frank, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, on "The Place of the Expert in a Democratic Society."

The officers of the Association for Symbolic Logic elected for terms beginning January 1, 1944, are as follows: President (for a term of three years), Alfred Tarski; Vice President (for a term of three years), Charles A. Baylis; Members of the Executive Committee (for a term of three years), Carl G. Hempel and Karl Menger; (for a term of one year), Saunders MacLane.

Miss Dorothy Walsh, now of Wells College, has been appointed an Assistant Professorship at Smith College.